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In light of the increasing levels of polarization in terms of voting behavior among 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives over the 112th, 113th, and 114th 
Congresses, coupled with the recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commision 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which authorized the use of unlimited 
fundraising and expenditure by outside groups in elections, the question was raised 
whether or not there was a correlation between these two occurrences. Specifically, this 
paper asks “what role does Super PAC funding play in the roll call vote choices of House 
Members of the 114th Congress?” To answer this, a chi-square test of independence is 
conducted between the dependent variable of vote choice and the independent variable of 
Super PAC funding across several different issue strata. I find that Super PAC funding is 
correlated strongly to House of Representatives members’ roll call vote choice. 
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In 2013 a highly polarized Congress, voting along party lines, and unable to 
compromise on a plan to postpone budget sequestration, engaged in “chicken-style” 
negotiation strategies that ended up in a sixteen day government shutdown (Louk & 
Damage, 2015). The shutdown cost the United States’ economy billions in gross 
domestic product and brought the U.S. Treasury within one week of defaulting on debt 
obligations, which would have had catastrophic consequences for the economy by 
endangering U.S. credit worthiness (Nippani & Smith, 2014). The “chicken style” of 
negotiation is at least partially a result of the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses status as 
being the most ideologically polarized Congresses in history, with the highest margins of 
voting along party lines (Lee et al., 2015). However, this paper seeks to analyze the 
contribution of another variable towards the unprecedented levels in voting along party 
lines, a variable only made salient in 2010 by the Supreme Court ruling in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commision 558 U.S. 310 (2010): outside groups with no 
fundraising or expenditure caps known as Super PACs.  More specifically; this paper 
seeks to answer what role does Super PAC funding play in the roll call vote choices of 
House Members of the 114th Congress? In so doing, this paper hopes to contribute in part 
to answering the larger question at hand: what is the cause of historical levels of 
polarization and party line voting in the United States’ Congress? 
This paper seeks to answer the research question by analyzing the partisan nature 
of the 114th Congress and by determining the role that Super PAC funding (dollar 
amounts given by Super PAC entities to political campaigns) plays in roll call vote 
choices (“yes” or “no” vote choices by political representatives on a bill) while 
controlling for other variables traditionally held in the literature as important in 
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determining voting behavior: ideological polarization, and constituent considerations. 
This is an important question to consider as it has implications for the dynamics of how 
the American system of representative democracy functions: primarily whether or not it 
is beholden to the will of the people or to monetary interests. The answer to this question 
has larger implications in determining the role that money should play in elections, and to 
what extent it plays that role. In answering the research question and exploring its 
implications, first, a background will be given establishing the importance of Super PAC 
funding and arguments in the literature concerning its impact on voting behavior. Next, 
competing explanatory variables for voting behavior, constituent considerations and 
ideology will be defined and the literature surrounding those variables will be briefly 
explored. Afterwards, the theory and related hypotheses will be laid out, followed by the 
methods taken to conduct the content analysis. Afterwards, a results and discussion 
section will determine how well the hypotheses and theory fit the data. 
Super PACs, Their Legal Structure and Practical Applications 
  
Super PACs came into being in 2010 following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310. The case, whose 
background is unimportant for this paper’s purposes, ruled that corporations and unions 
had the same First Amendment rights to political speech as individuals, i.e., they could 
make unlimited contributions to PACs. This paved the way for a new breed of Super 
PACs. By definition, a Super PACs is a political action committee legally entitled to raise 
donations in unlimited amounts. Super PACs differ from non-super PACs in several 
ways. Principally, ordinary PACs can contribute to political candidates directly whereas 
Super PACs can only make independent expenditures (expenditures not directly 
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authorized by a political campaign), but can still advocate for the election or defeat of a 
candidate so long as no collaboration takes place with the candidate the PAC supports 
(Briffault, 2012). Additionally, federal law prohibits individual contributions in excess of 
over $5,000 to PACs whereas there is no limit on individual contributions with Super 
PACs (Briffault, 2012). There are several other types of funding vehicles, such as 527s 
and 501(c)s but they are subject to different legal limitations in regards to the amount of 
the overall percentage of funds they may devote to electioneering and are so insignificant 
in terms of overall political contributions relative to Super PACs that they are of no 
concern to this research paper (Briffault, 2012). 
Although Super PACs are not allowed to communicate with the candidate they 
support, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that such collaboration takes place, 
even if the legal limitations are technically followed (Krumholz, 2016). The primary way 
Super PACs get around this limitation is that many of the staff on the Super PAC used to 
be employed by the candidate the Super PAC supports, a practice known as pre-
candidacy collaboration (Krumholz, 2016; Klepner, 2016). This practice is known as 
‘testing the waters’ according to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations, and 
is when a potential candidate can directly collaborate with a Super PAC prior to filing an 
official statement of candidacy with the FEC (Ryan, 2015). A good case study that 
characterizes the strategy is Jeb Bush’s 2016 presidential primary campaign, although he 
is far from the only presidential candidate to use the ‘testing the waters’ loophole (Ryan, 
2015).  
Jeb Bush did not officially file his statement of candidacy to the FEC until June 
15, 2015, more than six months after announcing he was ‘actively exploring the 
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possibility’ of a presidential campaign (Ryan, 2015; Klepner, 2016). During those six 
months, Bush travelled the country, speaking in front of crowds, and headlining at least 
thirty-nine fundraising events as a ‘featured guest’ (Ryan, 2015; Klepner, 2016). Two 
weeks after Jeb Bush officially declared his candidacy, his campaign Super PAC, Right 
to Rise USA, had already raised over $103 million (Klepner, 2016). Mike Murphy, top 
adviser of Jeb Bush’s 1998 and 2002 gubernatorial campaigns, headed Right to Rise USA 
and admitted to collaborating with the Bush campaign in the ‘testing the waters’ phase 
(Klepner, 2016). Although after Bush’s official statement of candidacy he ceased 
communication with the Bush campaign, he stated ‘he was well informed as of a week 
ago’ and went on to describe what Bush’s message would focus on as the presidential 
race continued (Kaczynski & Ben-Meir, 2015; Klepner, 2016). There is not a clear legal 
standing on this practice, and in this grey area Super PACs obtain a loophole around the 
collaboration restriction the Supreme Court gave (Klepner, 2016).  
Armed with this loophole, Super PACs engage in spending that would have been 
unprecedented in the pre-Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission era. Exact 
Super PAC funding numbers spent in elections are impossible to come by due to some 
political candidates possessing multiple fundraising entities which Super PACs can 
contribute, some of whom are not subject to the same disclosure regulations as Super 
PACs (Krumholz, 2016). For example, according to Title 11 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations governing Federal Elections, a Super PAC could give funding to a 501(c)(4) 
or 501(c)(6). While the Super PAC must disclose that it provided funding to either type 
of organization, 501(c)(4)s and 501(c)(6)s are not required to disclose in their annual 
reports to the IRS the amount of money spent on issue-specific ads, and the origin of the 
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money spent on those ads is not publically available (Krumholz, 2016). With this in 
mind, in the year of their inception Super PACs spent an estimated $65 million in 
independent expenditures, and were heavily involved in over a dozen House and Senate 
races (Briffault, 2012). In the 2008 presidential election cycle before the ruling in 558 
U.S. 310 (2010), $144 million was spent; in the 2012 election over $1 billion was spent, a 
594% increase (Hansen, Rocca, & Ortiz, 2015). It is clear, therefore, that the Supreme 
Court’s decision had a tremendous impact in regards to the amount of money in the 
political system. The impact of this Super PAC money on American politics has been 
hotly debated; it was a cornerstone of Bernie Sanders’ 2016 presidential primary attack 
on the Democratic establishment as a corrupt regime dominated by wealthy interests. 
However, the myriad of impacts that Citizens United has had on society and the dynamic 
of American politics is beyond the scope of this paper, which simply seeks to examine its 
impact on roll call voting behavior. It is sufficient to say that it has had a tremendous 
impact. 
Previous Studies on the Influence of Money on Voting Behavior 
 Whenever money and politics mix there is always a question as to whether there 
is the potential for corruption to arise from such a relationship, in this paper’s case, the 
potential corruption being examined is whether or not money can effectively “buy” vote 
choice. There is large disagreement over the influence of campaign contributions on 
voting behavior of political representatives. Some scholars prior to Citizens United 
contended that the limits placed on traditional PACs are narrow, and that money is a 
lesser contributor in shaping representatives’ policy decisions to other factors such as 
lobbying (Wright, 1990). Wright’s study was limited to the House Ways and Means and 
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Agricultural Committees, but found that although campaign funding from outside groups 
plays a role in shaping representatives’ voting behavior in an indirect way, it was 
primarily lobbying that shaped representatives’ voting choices (1990). However, Wright 
acknowledged that his study was limited to two Committees and very specific issues 
related to those Committees, and that money may play a larger or smaller role in other 
issues being considered (1990). This would seem to require any future studies on the 
impact of campaign contributions to stratify according to different issue types to draw 
meaningful conclusions. 
 Other studies focused on the impact of campaign contributions in regards to 
voting behavior by political representatives have found that, extremely wealthy campaign 
donors have been able to gain influence over legislators (Cook, Page, & Moskowitz, 
2014). Compared to other contributors who gave lesser amounts, wealthy donors were 
more likely to hold the attention of political representatives and shape their vote outcome 
(Cook, Page, & Moskowitz, 2014). This line of reasoning is transferable to Super PAC 
funding, the only difference being that Super PAC donors are a collection individuals 
with of similar or identical interests rather than one single individual wealthy donor.  
 Still other studies claim that campaign contributions rarely matter because 
funding groups tend to give money to like-minded legislators (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2005). 
Still, Roscoe and Jenkins qualify their claim that in cases were excessively large amounts 
are given, or one-third of cases, campaign contributions can play a defining role in 
determining a political representative’s vote choice (2005). Roscoe and Jenkins’ study 
was published before the 2010 ruling in Citizens United, however, and the potential to 
give excessive amounts of money to political representatives has increased greatly due to 
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the advent of Super PACs. Therefore, being informed by these previous studies, the 
theory this paper develops can be seen as a test of whether these traditional theories still 
hold in the face of campaign funding vehicles with no fundraising or expenditure limits. 
Theory 
Control Variables 
There are a number of factors in the literature explaining how representatives 
make decisions, and these factors comprise the control variables for this study. The first 
among these are Constituent Considerations. Constituent considerations are defined as 
the degree of responsiveness of political representatives to the opinions of the electorate 
and are the foundation of a representative democracy, in particular American democracy, 
going back to the work of John Locke and social contract theory (Riley, 1982). By this it 
is meant that political representatives’ voting behavior should relate in a measurable way 
to the interests of their constituencies; political representatives are a medium through 
which the will of the people is channeled into policy outcomes (Riley, 1982). Most 
important for this paper’s purposes however, is the rational actor theory of politics, which 
states that political representatives have their own set of identifiable interests, separate 
and identifiable from their constituents’ interests (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). This creates 
the principal-agent problem, which put simply means that sometimes political 
representatives do not implement, or act contrary to their constituencies’ interests because 
they are pursuing their personal interests (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). The electorate 
expresses their interests and viewpoints through vote choice (Hamlin & Jennings, 2011).  
Therefore, constituent considerations are most salient in competitive 
congressional districts where an incumbent faces high risk of defeat, as the personal 
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interest of an incumbent staying in office will prompt an incumbent to vote in line with 
his constituency’s interests in order to capture their vote choice on election day 
(Henderson & Brooks, 2016). A hard-fought election is generally accepted to be defined 
as a race in which the competitors have similar amounts of funding, engenders enough 
media coverage to allow the public to be aware of both candidates, and in which the 
margin of victory is narrow (Westlye, 1983; Jacobson, 1987). Under these circumstances, 
constituent considerations are most salient; in the absence of the aforementioned 
circumstances, they become less salient. 
Since whether or not an election is hard fought cannot be determined prior to an 
election, there are two theories which this paper will be subscribing to in an attempt to 
ascertain whether or not political incumbents expect a hard fought election in 2016; the 
economic expectations/political punishment model and the political economy model. 
Simply put, the economic expectations and political punishment model states that voters 
use previous economic performance of a nation to form vote choices against the political 
party to which the electorate attributes poor economic performance (Rudolph, 2003). 
Conversely, if the economy has been performing well and the electorate attributes that 
success to a political party, they will vote for that party (Rudolph, 2003). The political 
economy model is a modification of the political punishment model, which at its simplest 
form states that whether or not a house seat changes party hands is a function of a 
political party’s national popularity, the prevailing economic conditions, and whether or 
not the election under scrutiny is a midterm election (Alesina, Londregan, & Rosenthal, 
1993). Using these models, reasonably accurate determinations can be made as to 
whether candidates anticipate hard-fought elections in upcoming elections. 
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Ideology. Ideology is of particular importance to the two party American political 
systems. The ideology of politically elite actors within the political arena has been proven 
to influence the ideology and predispositions of the electorate (Zaller, 1992). Ideology at 
the level of the politically elite has also become a driving force in voting behavior of 
members of the House of Representatives, particularly since the shifting of political 
debate from the New Deal Cleavage, characterized by economic cerebral issues, to an 
Authoritarian Cleavage characterized by more visceral, gut level reactions (Hetherington 
& Weiler, 2009). This was done by the Republican party during the civil rights era in a 
successful bid to regain national political competitiveness (Hetherington & Weiler, 
2009). Since that time polarization in American politics has reached record levels; a 
testament to the powerful influence of ideology in American politics. 
This paper aims to describe the impact of Super PAC funding on a political 
landscape already defined by the other powerful formative phenomenon of constituency 
considerations and ideology. To further nuance the descriptive nature of this paper the 
examination of Super PAC’s impact across the different issue strata of social, economic 
and foreign policy issues will be undertaken. In so doing, this paper will provide a 
foundation for further research to clarify the role of Super PAC’s within American 
politics. 
Before moving into the particulars of the theory it is important to define several 
concepts. The independent variable is “Super PAC funding” defined as the net dollar 
amount a politically elite actor receives from Super PACs with a vested interest in a vote 
for or against a bill. “Political elites” are defined in this paper as members of the House 
of Representatives. “Voting behavior” is defined as vote choice during a roll call vote. 
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Different issue strata were utilized to measure the influence of Super PAC funding on roll 
call vote choice because given the literature on constituency considerations and elite 
ideology, these considerations may be more relevant than Super PAC funding in 
determining vote choice by political elites due to issue context. 
Hypotheses 
There are four hypotheses this paper subscribes to. The first is Super PAC 
Funding and the Economic Issue Strata. It is expected that Super PAC funding influence 
is expected to determine the vote outcome of politically elite actors to a high degree in 
the economic strata. This expectation occurs for one primary reason: the rational actor 
theory of politics, which identifies as the central problem of any democratic political 
process the principal-agent issue (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). From this perspective, the 
main concern of democratic governments should be to have institutional arrangements so 
that politically elite actors, with their own identifiable interests, can be induced to act in 
the interest of their principals, or the electorate (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). 
However, recall earlier from the literature review the historical shift away from an 
economic, cerebral New-Deal Cleavage to a more visceral, social issue oriented 
Authoritarian cleavage in American politics (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). This shift in 
cleavage lines means that economic issues mean less to the American voter than visceral, 
social issues at the macro level than during previous Congresses, and are thus less salient 
at the electoral level. This cleavage shift, taken with the relatively recent Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United, which opened the metaphorical floodgates for money to enter 
into the political arena, creates a unique phenomenon. Corporations can now inject 
unlimited amounts of funding into political campaigns, albeit only “independently;” 
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again, recall from the literature review the 594% increase in PAC spending from the 2008 
presidential election to the 2012 presidential election (Hansen, Rocca, & Ortiz, 2015). 
Such a massive funding increase has amplified the principal-agent problem 
associated with the rational actor theory. Evidence for this can be found in basic 
economic sociology, more specifically how economic outcomes depend on the structure 
of social networks, and most importantly for this paper, institutional configurations 
(Beckert, 2013). Money is the primary and most effective means that any actor, but 
especially corporations, uses to align institutional configurations in their favor to achieve 
desirable economic outcomes (Beckert, 2013). This fact, coupled with the reduced 
salience of economic issues to the average American voter, causes this paper to theorize 
that constituent concerns carry less relevance than Super PAC funding in vote choice on 
economic issues to the politically elite. The reception of Super PAC funds by a political 
candidate carries with it the implicit agreement that the donor’s viewpoint on certain 
issues will receive extra consideration (Lee, 2015). This is a fundamental truth 
acknowledged extensively in U.S. legal practice going back to 1975 and the Supreme 
Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 
This is an arrangement many politically elite actors are willing to make, as the 
increased funding allows more political advertisements to be put out. This is an especially 
important consideration since television attack ads have been proven extremely effective 
in determining voting choice of the American electorate, increasing the odds of selection 
of a particular candidate by as much as 10% for individuals who watch television every 
day (Krupnikov, 2012). This means that candidates can largely ignore their 
constituencies’ viewpoint on issues not salient to the electorate, when a hard-fought 
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election is not anticipated, as Super PAC funded television ads can offset any negative 
backlash from a particular vote on an economic issue. 
The next hypothesis is Super PAC Funding and the Social Issue Strata. It is also 
hypothesized that Super PAC funding will be least relevant among the social issue strata 
in terms of vote choice. Credit for this hypothesis goes to Heatherington & Weiler’s 2009 
book Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. The reasoning for this 
hypothesis is similar to the reasoning for why Super PAC funding is most relevant for 
economic issue vote choice. Drawing principally from the shift in political cleavages 
from cerebral, New-Deal to visceral, Authoritarian lines, this paper hypothesizes that 
since social issues are visceral in nature, funding from Super PACs will be of secondary 
importance compared to constituent considerations (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). This 
is due to the corresponding rise in salience of social issues in the minds of the electorate 
compared to economic issues, thus making constituent considerations the primary driver 
of the politically elites’ voting choice.  
Salience, or the level of information available to the public on particular issue and 
visibility of the same issue taken together, is the primary cause of political activism by 
the electorate, as it raises the amount of information available to the electorate (Iverson & 
Soskice, 2015). When an electorate has low levels of information regarding an issue, it 
generally takes a centrist attitude, making it susceptible to influence from information 
filtered by the politically elite (Iverson & Soskice, 2015). When this is not the case, and 
the electorate has high levels of information on an issue, polarization at the electorate 
level occurs, and their political representatives become responsive to their viewpoints, 
behaving as rational actors seeking to retain office (Iverson & Soskice, 2015; Brennan & 
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Hamlin, 1999). The primary reason for this behavior from political elites is because 
television ads, funded by Super PACs and other sources, may not be able to garner as 
much support from the electorate as was lost by an unpopular vote on a salient issue. 
Political elites will be unwilling to engage in behavior that might compromise their 
individual interests as an agent in the principal-agent framework, in this case retention of 
office (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). 
The third hypothesis is Super PAC Funding and the Foreign Policy Issue Strata. 
Next, it is hypothesized that Super PACs will have a moderate level of influence in 
regards to foreign policy issues because of the salience of foreign policy issues to the 
electorate, due to their close relation to national security matters, which are extremely 
visceral in nature (Goren, 1997). It is supported secondarily by the counterbalance to this 
salience, the inability of the electorate to attribute responsibility of a poor outcome on a 
foreign policy issue to the legislative or executive branch. Attribution of responsibility to 
a political branch directly affects the electorate’s formation of opinions towards 
politically elite actors (Ruder, 2015). This phenomenon is largely driven by media 
coverage, and with most political media outlets controlled by political parties, or 
considered partisan enclaves, information inconsistencies arise and the electorate 
becomes susceptible to polarization that is engineered by the politically elite (Weeks, 
Ksiazek, & Holbert, 2016). 
This information inconsistency becomes even more apparent when the legislative 
and executive branches are controlled by different parties, as there is greater incentive for 
partisan media outlets to portray the other party poorly. This is the case with the 114th 
Congress, a Democrat Barack Obama is president, and the House and Senate are 
   16 
 
controlled by the Republicans by margins of 247-193 and 54-44 respectively (Manning, 
2015). Therefore, this paper theorizes that any information advantage gained by the 
electorate due to increased salience is offset due to the fact that most of the information 
received is filtered by political interests.  
Finally, Hard-Fought Elections. Lastly, the final hypothesis theorizes that the 
previous three hypotheses only hold true if a political representative does not anticipate a 
hard-fought general election. The reasoning behind this hypothesis lies in the literature. 
By the definition established earlier, a hard fought election is one which the competitors 
have similar amounts of funding, engenders enough media coverage to allow the public 
to be aware of both candidates, and in which the margin of victory is narrow (Westlye, 
1983; Jacobson, 1987). If there is a similar amount of funding, then holding everything 
else equal, no advantage can be gained through advertisement spending. There is 
sufficient media coverage to make both candidates highly salient to the electorate, 
regardless of incumbency, and so the candidates are more highly scrutinized than a 
political representative who is not engaged in a hard-fought election. Most importantly, 
the margin of victory is expected to be narrow, so any political misstep on an issue not 
normally salient to the electorate can and will be exploited to gain marginal advantages in 
vote count (Westlye, 1983). Therefore, if and only if a candidate does not expect a hard-
fought election will the other three hypotheses hold true.  
It is hypothesized that the degree to which Super PAC funding levels affect voting 
behavior is issue category specific across the three issue strata this paper will focus on: 
social, economic, and foreign policy. It is theorized that different loyalties are primed to 
differing degrees according to issue type, and so Super PAC funding will play a greater 
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or lesser role according to issue type, controlling for issue salience. It is generally 
theorized that Super PAC funding will have at least some level of influence across all 
three issue strata. More specifically, this paper postulates that the highest level of Super 
PAC funding influence will be in the economic issue strata, and the lowest in the social 
issue strata, with a moderate amount of influence occurring in the foreign policy issue 
strata. It is also hypothesized that the previously stated theory only holds true for 
politically elite actors who do not anticipate hard-fought general elections, and only when 
controlling for ideology and polarization. 
Methodology 
 
Before moving into the particulars of the methodology, it is important to reiterate 
several definitions explicitly. First, “political elites” are defined in this paper as members 
of the House of Representatives. Secondly, “voting behavior” is defined as vote choice 
during a roll call vote. “Voting behavior” is also the dependent variable. The dependent 
variable is measured a “yes” or “no” vote on a final roll call vote of passage, which was 
coded in a binary fashion, 1 for a yes vote, and 0 for a no vote. If a political elite for some 
reason is not present for a vote, or abstains, the dependent variable cannot be measured. 
This study does not seek to model competing loyalties political elites have to their 
ideologies, Super PACs, and constituencies when faced with a voting choice, but instead 
controls for ideology and constituent considerations so that the role of Super PAC 
funding in voting behavior can be understood most clearly. 
The independent variable “Super PAC funding” is measured as the net dollar 
amount a politically elite actor receives from Super PACs with a vested interest in a vote 
for or against a bill. Super PAC funding is operationalized by a simple dollar count of 
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funds each political representative in the sample received from Super PACs which have a 
vested interest in a particular vote outcome, i.e. the Super PACs which publically stated 
what their position on an issue a particular bill concerned was, and therefore whose vote 
preference on a bill can be discerned.  Each political representative in the sample has a 
separate dollar amount of funds received from Super PACs in favor of passage, and funds 
received from Super PACs against passage. All data regarding Super PAC funding levels 
was found on https://www.opensecrets.org, a website founded by a non-partisan, 
independent research organization dedicated to collecting data concerning the influence 
of money in politics. Only Super PAC funding originating from April 1, 2013-March 31, 
2015 was used. This date range was selected because the 114th Congress was elected in 
2014, and enables any analysis to incorporate the effects of both pre and post-election 
Super PAC influence, thus minimizing any distortion that may occur from unmeasured 
Super PAC funding. Additionally, according to the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA), Super PACs are only required to report any disbursements that occurred for the 
purposes of electioneering communications on a semi-annual basis; so, cutting the range 
off at March 31, 2015 incorporates as much Super PAC money in the analysis as 
reasonably possible (Krumholz, 2016).  
The first of the control variables is “Constituent Considerations” defined as 
constituent viewpoints and opinions on a particular issue. Constituent considerations are 
measured according to whether a political incumbent anticipated a hard fought election in 
the upcoming 2016 election. The ratings assigned to the individual members of the 
sample’s Congressional districts by the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics 
determined the status of the election as “hard fought”. The methodology behind the 
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Center’s rating system is an aggregate of ratings assigned by several independent 
researchers who attempt to forecast election outcomes using a variety of political 
economy and political punishment models with economic caveats, of the type described 
in the literature review (“Political Science Election Forecasts,” 2016). The ratings were 
on a scale which rated districts as “Safe Republican”, “Likely Republican”, “Leans 
Republican”, “Toss-Up”, “Leans Democrat”, “Likely Democrat”, and “Safe Democrat” 
(“Political Science Election Forecasts,” 2016). Due to the aggregation of many different 
variations of the political economy and political punishment models, the particular 
weaknesses of any one model are not likely to affect validity, and so the 
operationalization of this variable is considered valid. The reliability of this method of 
operationalization is also very high; the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics has 
correctly predicted the election outcomes of House, Senate, Presidential, and 
Gubernatorial races at a rate of 98% in 2004, 100% in 2008, and 97% in 2012. 
Only “Toss-Up” rated districts are considered likely to be hard-fought because 
only the “Toss-Up” classification indicates a Congressional district has a high chance of 
changing party hands. Since hard-fought primaries encourage political candidates to 
appeal more to their party’s base, and thus do not have the effect of measuring the degree 
to which constituent considerations are applied across the Congressional district as a 
whole, they are not considered. Additionally, the primaries involve intraparty competition 
whereas this paper seeks to measure interparty competition and there is no danger of a 
House seat changing party hands within a primary election, while the possibility of a seat 
changing party hands is a common condition across all hard-fought general elections.  
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The second control variable is “Ideology”: The degree to which a politically elite 
actor is conservative/liberal. The most ideologically polarized members of each party 
were chosen according to data from govtrack.us, which scores members according to 
their rates of bill co-sponsorship across party lines and within their own parties 
(“Ideology Analysis of Members of Congress,” 2013). The methodology govtrack.us uses 
is proven to have high validity and reliability, producing nearly identical results to 
another, traditional operationalization of ideology and polarization; the use of voting 
records (“Ideology Analysis of Members of Congress,” 2013). 
Sample 
 The sample consists of two parts: the selected political representatives and the 
bills representing the economic, social, and foreign policy issue strata. Forty members of 
the United States’ House of Representatives from the 114th Congress were selected, 
twenty from both the Republican and Democratic parties respectively. The forty were the 
most ideologically polarized members of their parties in the House selected using data 
from, excluding non-voting political representatives. By doing this, ideology and 
polarization are controlled for in the sample selection, and it becomes reasonable to 
utilize the median voter theorem to state that a political representative’s vote choice can 
be explained by Super PAC funding as long as constituent considerations are not a factor 
(i.e. a representative was not in a “Toss-Up” district). The Median voter theorem states 
that simple models of public choice can be reasonably used in place of more complex 
models because simple models allow knowledge to be transmitted more efficiently from 
person to person, simple models provide us with a means of analysis that allow a myriad 
of hypotheses about more complex phenomena to be developed, and without the 
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framework provided by simple models, complex hypotheses would be next to 
meaningless (Rowley & Schneider, 2004). Not surprisingly, none of the House of 
Representative members included in the sample had a “Toss-Up” rating for their 
respective Congressional districts; since polarization was controlled for through sample 
selection of the most polarized members of each party. The most heavily ideologically 
polarized members of Congress typically come from districts which, primarily through 
gerrymandering, but also through other means, contain the most polarized portions of the 
electorate, therefore making their districts extremely safe (Kirkland, 2014). The data 
concerning hard-fought elections can be found below. 
(Insert Table 1) 
 Representing the three different issue strata were three different bills, all of which 
were proposed during the 114th Congress. All data for the bills selected comes from 
https://www.congress.gov. The bills chosen to represent issues with similar levels of 
salience to the electorate across the economic, social, and foreign policy issue strata. 
Representing these issue strata are the issues of energy production, immigration 
originating from Mexico and Central America, and the Iranian nuclear deal, respectively. 
The bills epitomizing these three issues are, in order, Senate Bill 1 (2015), House 
Resolution 3009 (2015), and House Resolution 3461 (2015). All three of these bills, and 
the issues they represent and are directly tied to, engendered similar levels of national 
media coverage, and so have similar saliencies to the electorate (Barrett et al., 2015; 
Daveport, 2015; “Senate Dems block anti-sanctuary city bill”, 2015). Limiting the scope 
of the sample to only members of the House of Representatives during the 114th 
Congress, and bills proposed during the 114th Congress controls for distortive influences. 
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Controlling for saliency eliminates any distorting effect that variable levels of saliency 
may have on the constituent considerations variable. 
 Senate Bill 1 (2015) was selected, as mentioned before, for its saliency. Other 
economic issues were too region specific to be considered to represent the economic 
issue strata; only the Keystone Oil XL Pipeline had a national economic nature with 
direct potential effects on national oil prices and dependence, and so this issue was 
chosen above others (Gravelle & Lachapelle, 2015). Titled the “Keystone XL Approval 
Act”, the bill was brought to the floor in a Republican-led effort to reduce the United 
States’ dependency on foreign oil by increasing the capability of the United States’ to 
access shale oil reserves. Senate Bill 1 (2015) passed 270-152 in the House of 
Representatives before being vetoed by President Obama.  
 Representing the social issue strata, and the issue of immigration, is House 
Resolution 3009 (2015). Titled “Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act,” the purpose 
of the bill was to withhold federal funding to states that prohibited state and local 
officials from gathering information on individual’s citizenship and immigration status, 
by amending section 241(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It was a Republican-
led effort to counter President Obama’s executive actions regarding deferred action 
deportation. The bill passed 241-179 in the House of Representatives almost entirely 
along party lines. 
 The foreign policy issue stratum is represented by House Resolution 3461 (2015). 
The bill was a Democratic-led effort to legitimize President Obama’s executive 
agreement to lift sanctions levied against Iran in exchange for scaling back its nuclear 
program. Although the House of Representatives has no constitutional power to 
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legitimize or delegitimize any issue related foreign policy, House Resolution 3461 (2015) 
was meant to be a powerful symbolic gesture. The bill failed by a 162-269 vote, and was 
not passed. The only other foreign policy issue of similar salience during the 114th 
Congress in the minds of the American electorate was the Ukrainian crisis, which was an 
occupation of Ukrainian Crimea by the Russian Federation. However, since no bills 
related to the Ukrainian crisis reached the House floor for a roll call vote, House 
Resolution 3461 (2015) is the most appropriate bill to represent this issue stratum.  
Results 
 To test the hypotheses presented in theory section: that Super PAC funding will 
have its highest level of influence on the vote choice of political elites in the economic 
issue strata, a moderate level of influence in the foreign policy issue strata, and the lowest 
level of influence on the social issue strata, a chi-square test of independence was 
utilized. The chi squared test of independence is best suited to determine whether or not 
there is a statistically significant relationship between two nominal or categorical 
variables. In this case the categorical variables are Democrats and Republicans, and 
House of Representative members who voted in line with the dominant Super PAC 
funding frame or against it, a binary 0, 1 measure. Although the sample contains a base of 
forty representatives, the twenty most polarized from each political party in the House of 
Representatives; in each issue strata, some political representatives were excluded on the 
basis that they either did not vote, or had a zero dollar sum total of Super PAC funding on 
the particular issue stratum under consideration. The layout of the chi-square table for 
each issue strata is two rows and two columns; the rows consist of the Republican and 
Democrat categories, and the columns are made up of the voted consistently with 
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dominant Super PAC funding frame, and voted inconsistent with Super PAC funding 
frame. 
 There are no additional rows to include Republicans or Democrats with hard-
fought elections, this is due to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, there are none included 
within the sample that are experiencing anticipation of a hard fought election in 2016. 
The development of a null hypothesis and an alternative is required for a chi-square test 
to be carried out. For all of the issue strata, the null hypothesis is a variation of “There is 
no association between Super PAC funding and vote choice of political representatives.” 
The alternative hypothesis for all of the issue strata is a variation of “There is an 
association between Super PAC funding and vote choice of political representatives.” 
The null hypothesis is disproven if a high enough chi-square value is obtained to declare 
a statistically significant relationship according to the degree of freedom and level of 
confidence that is being utilized. Chi-square tests of independence require a degree of 
freedom (DF) to be calculated in order to proceed with statistical analysis. The degree of 
freedom is calculated according to the formula: DF= (number of rows-1) x (number of 
columns-1).  In the case of all the tables above, this formula produces a degree of 
freedom of one. All of these tables were analyzed utilizing a 95% confidence level. This 
confidence level, coupled with the degree of freedom value of one for each table requires 
a chi-square value of 3.84 or higher to declare statistical significance. The chi-square 
value for each table is obtained by first calculating the expected count for each value 
within a given table, the formula for which is: expected count= (row total x column 
total)/overall total. Once these values are calculated, the chi-square value for a table can 
be found by applying this formula: (observed count-expected count)2/expected count to 
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each value within the table) and taking the sum of them all. Then, whether or not there is 
a statistically significant correlation present is determined by comparing whether or not 
the chi-square value is larger than the 3.84 requirement for declaring a statistically 
significant relationship, for any lesser chi squared value would indicate that p > 0.05. 
Findings & Discussion 
Hypothesis 1: Economic Issue Stratum 
  
Republican-led Senate Bill 1 relating to the construction of the Keystone XL Oil 
Pipeline was chosen to represent the economic issue stratum. Per the methods described, 
all non-voting political representatives were excluded from the sample, as well as those 
representatives who had equal positive (for passage) and negative (against passage) Super 
PAC funding frames, for a zero sum of Super PAC dollars would indicate that their 
influence could not possibly be involved in the decision making process of those 
representatives where this condition is present. This is because when the Super PAC 
funding frames favoring yes and no votes are of equal dollar amounts, the effect is the 
same as if the Super PAC funding frames favoring yes and no votes were both zero, or 
nonexistent. The political representatives excluded on the basis of a non-vote were 
Barbara Lee from the Democratic Party, and David P. Roe from the Republican Party. 
Those political representatives excluded from the sample due to a dominant Super PAC 
funding frame being absent are Jose E. Serrano and Frederica S. Wilson from the 
Democratic Party and Kenny Marchant from the Republican Party. The complete data set 
for the economic issue stratum can be found in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2) 
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 This data was then used to construct the chi-square table below to test for 
categorical independence. The null hypothesis accompanying this table is “Super PAC 
funding and vote choice on bills related to economic issues are independent” and the 
alternative hypothesis is “Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to 
economic issues are not independent.” 
(Insert Table 3) 
 A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between 
Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy. The relation 
between these variables was significant, X2 (2, N=35) = 21.052, p < .05. Republicans 
were more likely to vote with their dominant Super PAC funding frame. This was not a 
surprising find, as it was an expected result according to the theory that the strongest 
correlation would be present between Super PAC funding and voting behavior in the 
economic issue strata.  
What is somewhat curious, however, is that the relationship between the dominant 
Super PAC funding frame and voting behavior is positively correlated among Republican 
representatives and negatively correlated among Democratic representatives. Clearly, as 
the table above demonstrates, the Republicans voted in line with their dominant Super 
PAC funding frame at a rate of 94.44%, whereas the Democrats voted in line with their 
dominant Super PAC funding frame at a rate of only 21.43%. In addition, as the raw data 
demonstrates, all the Democrats who voted against their dominant Super PAC funding 
frame voted against a positive (in favor of passage) frame, but they on average received 
lower levels of funding from the funding frame in favor of passage than their Republican 
counterparts. This additional information could possibly serve as an explanation as to the 
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different relationships between Super PAC funding and voting behavior among the two 
political parties; perhaps simply not enough money was given to the Democratic 
representatives to cause them to abandon their traditional ideological standpoint of 
holding environmental considerations in a higher regard than economic considerations. 
But it is also possible that the smaller dollar amounts offered to Democrats from Super 
PACs in favor of passage relative to their Republican counterparts was to influence their 
vote choice on other bills, and that a higher dollar amount was not given because those 
Super PACs were aware they could pass a bill for a cheaper amount by offering more 
money to the party more ideologically receptive to their preferred bill outcome 
(Republicans) and which also held a majority in the House of Representatives 
(Republicans). 
Hypothesis 2: Social Issue Stratum 
The bill chosen to represent the social issue stratum was Republican-led House 
Resolution 3009, which was entitled “Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act.” There 
was only one non-voting political representative that had to be excluded from the sample 
for this bill, Democrat John Conyers, Jr. There were however, a number of political 
representatives that were excluded on the basis of not having a dominant Super PAC 
funding frame; the Democrats excluded were Sheila Jackson Lee and Jose E. Serrano. 
The Republicans that were excluded according to this criterion were Paul A. Gosar, 
Vicky Hartzler, Billy Long, Kenny Marchant, and Pete Olson. The raw data concerning 
the social issue stratum can be found below. 
(Insert Table 4) 
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The above data was then used to construct a chi squared table identical to the one 
constructed for Senate Bill 1 and the economic issue stratum. In this instance, the null 
hypothesis for the chi squared table is “Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills 
related to social issues are independent,” which necessitates that the alternative 
hypothesis is “Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to social issues are not 
independent.” With these hypotheses in mind, the table below was constructed. 
(Insert Table 5) 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between 
Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy. The relation 
between these variables was significant, X2 (2, N=32) = 6.721, p < .05. Democrats were 
more likely to vote with their Super PAC funding frame. It was hypothesized in the 
theory that Super PAC funding would be least relevant to vote choice on bills within the 
social issue strata, and so far in this paper’s analysis, this holds true. The p value for the 
chi squared table related to Senate Bill 1 and the economic issue stratum was 0.00001, far 
less than the p value for House Resolution 3009 and the social issue stratum, is 0.0095. 
What is interesting to note, is that in contrast to the analysis conducted for Senate 
Bill 1, where the correlation to the dominant Super PAC funding frame was positive for 
Republican political representatives and negative for Democratic political 
representatives, the correlation is positive for both Democrat and Republican 
representatives for House Resolution 3009. Of all Republicans, 66.67% voted in line with 
their dominant Super PAC funding framework, and 100% of Democrats voted in line 
with their dominant Super PAC funding framework. Also notable is that the five 
Republicans who voted against their dominant Super PAC funding framework, 100% of 
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them had a dominant Super PAC funding framework which was in favor of a no vote on 
House Resolution 3009. This seems to lend additional credence to the explanation posited 
in the discussion of the findings of Senate Bill 1; that Super PACs fund those candidates 
who are already ideologically predisposed to vote in line with the Super PACs interests, 
likely in an attempt to spend the least amount of money to achieve a desirable vote 
outcome. This would make sense as during the 114th Congress, Republican political 
representatives, in pursuit of their ideological tenet of strong national security, have 
favored stricter border control relative to their Democratic counterparts. 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign Policy Issue Stratum 
 The final issue stratum to be analyzed is the foreign policy issue stratum, 
represented by House Resolution 3461. Titled “To Approve the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action, Signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, Relating to the Nuclear Program of 
Iran,” it was a Democrat led effort to legitimize President Obama’s unilateral 
negotiations with Iran, that was voted on shortly after a successful Democratic filibuster 
in the Senate to prevent the Iran deal from being challenged. As stated earlier, the House 
of Representatives has no real procedural power to ratify or prevent ratification of 
treaties; however the bill was intended to be a powerful symbolic gesture. Representative 
of this, no political representatives within the sample were excluded on the basis of not 
voting, but five Democrats and twelve Republicans, for a total of seventeen political 
representatives were excluded on the basis of not having a dominant Super PAC funding 
frame. This would seem to be indicative that Super PACs concerned with outcomes 
related to foreign policy bills do not typically fund members of the House of 
Representatives, but rather members of the Senate, where procedural power concerning 
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treaty ratification is constitutionally based. As just under half of the sample is excluded, 
rather than list the exclusions, they can be found in the raw data for House Resolution 
3461 below.  
(Insert Table 6) 
 The raw data above was used to construct a chi squared table similar to the ones 
used to analyze Senate Bill 1 and House Resolution 3009. In this instance, the null 
hypothesis format is “Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign 
policy issues are independent,” whereas the alternative hypothesis format is “Super PAC 
funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy issues are not independent.” 
Using these hypotheses, the table below was constructed and scrutinized. 
(Insert Table 7) 
 A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship 
between Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy. The 
relationship between these variables was significant, X2 (2, N=23) = 22.996, p < .05. 
Republicans were more likely to vote with their Super PAC funding frame than were 
Democrats.While the numbers seem to disprove the hypothesis that Super PAC funding 
is most relevant to vote choice on bills related to economic issues, the fact that 42.50% of 
the sample was excluded due to not having a dominant Super PAC funding frame testifies 
otherwise. What is interesting to note is that the correlation anomaly between political 
parties that was present in the economic issue stratum and Senate Bill 1 has returned. Out 
of the Republicans, 100% voted with their dominant Super PAC funding frame, and of 
the Democrats, 100% voted against their dominant Super PAC funding frame. This 
indicates a positive correlation among Super PAC funding and vote choice among 
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Republicans and a negative correlation among Super PAC funding and vote choice 
among Democrats. However, this is likely due to a lack of a large amount of Super PAC 
donors to House of Representative members with a vested interest in an outcome related 
to a foreign policy issue. This is evidenced by the fact that not a single political 
representative received funding from a Super PAC with an interest in passage of the bill. 
Therefore, it would seem more likely, given that 100% of Democrats in the sample voted 
for the bill, and 100% of Republicans in the sample voted against the bill, that ideology 
and polarization is the driving factor in vote choice on House Resolution 3461.  
Conclusion 
 While the theory was found to be true; the highest correlation among Super PAC 
funding and vote choice was in the economic issue strata, and the lowest correlation 
among Super PAC funding and vote choice was in the social issue strata, there is some 
uncertainty regarding the theory’s prediction about the foreign policy issue strata. Senate 
Bill 1 and its chi squared value of 21.052, and House Resolution 3009 and its chi squared 
value of 6.721 confirm the first and second hypotheses, but the chi squared value of the 
foreign policy issue stratum, 22.996, and its sample exclusion rate of 42.5% mean that no 
definite conclusions can be drawn as to the validity of the hypothesis that a moderate 
level of correlation would be found between Super PAC funding and vote choice in the 
foreign policy issue stratum. Additionally, in controlling for ideology and polarization in 
sample selection, there was an incidental bias against selecting political representatives 
with hard-fought elections, and so the hypothesis that there Super PAC funding only 
influences voting behavior in the absence of the anticipation of a hard-fought election 
was unable to be tested.  
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 The results of this paper’s analysis are unable to be extended prior to any 
Congress before 2010, as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commision 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) had not yet taken effect. Additionally, any findings concerning the different issue 
strata are limited somewhat in their extension to other cases, as only bills with similar 
levels of salience can be considered, and the analysis conducted in this paper needs to be 
undertaken in future Congresses to ensure it is valid and reliable. Sufficient numbers of 
bills in each issue strata were hard to come by that met salience requirements, or which 
were not somehow containing other issue strata simultaneously in addition to the ones 
intended to be analyzed. These considerations acknowledged, the analysis undertaken in 
this paper provides a useful case study of the impact of Super PAC funding on vote 
choice in the 114th Congress. At the very least, the results confirm Wright’s 1990 study’s 
suggestion that campaign contributions play a different role in determining political 
representatives’ vote choice across different issue strata. The results can also be 
interpreted to mean that Super PAC campaign contributions play a moderate to sizeable 
role in contemporary politics in the sense that they are strongly correlated to vote choice. 
Future studies which include ideological independent political representatives in the 
sample would be needed to confirm such a conclusion in order to minimize the possibility 
that the competing explanation of ideological polarization is not to blame. 
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Table 1 
  
 
Representative Sabato Rating District
Blackburn, Marsha Safe R Tennessee 7th
Chu, Judy Safe D California 27th
Clarke, Yvette D. Safe D New York 9th
Cohen, Steve Safe D Tennessee 9th
Conyers, John, Jr. Safe D Michigan 13th
Duncan, Jeff Safe R South Carolina 3rd
Edwards, Donna F. Safe D Maryland 4th
Ellison, Keith Safe D Minnesota 5th
Flores, Bill Safe R Texas 17th
Franks, Trent Safe R Arizona 8th
Gohmert, Louie Safe R Texas 1st
Gosar, Paul A. Safe R Arizona 4th
Grijalva, Raul M. Safe D Arizona 3rd
Hartzler, Vicky Safe R Missouri 4th
Hastings, Alcee L. Safe D Florida 20th
Honda, Michael M. Safe D California 17th
Huelskamp, Tim Safe R Kansas 1st
Jackson Lee, Sheila Safe D Texas 18th
Lamborn, Doug Safe R Colorado 5th
Latta, Robert E. Safe R Ohio 5th
Lee, Barbara Safe D California 13th
Long, Billy Safe R Missouri 7th
Marchant, Kenny Safe R Texas 24th
McDermott, Jim Safe D Washington 7th
McGovern, James P. Safe D Massachusetts 2nd
Moore, Gwen Safe D Wisconsin 4th
Mulvaney, Mick Safe R South Carolina 5th
Olson, Pete Safe R Texas 22nd
Rangel, Charles B. Safe D New York 13th
Roe, David P. Safe R Tennessee 1st
Rokita, Todd Safe R Indiana 4th
Schakowsky, Janice D. Safe D Illinois 9th
Serrano, Jose E. Safe D New York 15th
Sessions, Pete Safe R Texas 32nd
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh Safe D New York 25th
Takano, Mark Safe D California 41st
Walberg, Tim Lean R Michigan 7th
Westmoreland, Lynn A. Safe R Georgia 3rd
Wilson, Frederica S. Safe D Florida 24th
Wilson, Joe Safe R South Carolina 2nd
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Table 2 
 
  
 
 
 
Representative D/R Vote Total Funds PAC Dollars (Y) PAC Dollars (N) PAC Total (%)
Blackburn, Marsha R Y 931,659$      5,100$                  -$                      584,914$            
Chu, Judy D N 541,893$      3,250$                  -$                      129,260$            
Clarke, Yvette D. D N 228,754$      4,850$                  -$                      166,008$            
Cohen, Steve D N 268,740$      3,600$                  1,250$                  192,002$            
Conyers, John, Jr. D N 282,049$      3,000$                  -$                      205,350$            
Duncan, Jeff R Y 280,525$      7,950$                  -$                      141,250$            
Edwards, Donna F. D N 2,166,226$   10,400$                5,550$                  134,792$            
Ellison, Keith D N 1,028,207$   1,250$                  4,000$                  153,500$            
Flores, Bill R Y 934,347$      29,339$                -$                      546,770$            
Franks, Trent R Y 140,907$      12,700$                -$                      90,250$              
Gohmert, Louie R Y 381,240$      18,100$                -$                      50,500$              
Gosar, Paul A. R Y 225,819$      -$                     500$                     106,500$            
Grijalva, Raul M. D N 280,119$      500$                     3,000$                  155,968$            
Hartzler, Vicky R Y 474,296$      22,900$                -$                      176,900$            
Hastings, Alcee L. D N 218,841$      1,000$                  -$                      165,073$            
Honda, Michael M. D N 1,281,719$   11,142$                6,600$                  309,523$            
Huelskamp, Tim R Y 390,976$      8,550$                  -$                      66,200$              
Jackson Lee, Sheila D Y 171,171$      2,000$                  -$                      114,500$            
Lamborn, Doug R Y 286,818$      1,250$                  -$                      191,010$            
Latta, Robert E. R Y 435,620$      24,025$                -$                      232,447$            
Lee, Barbara D N/A 583,870$      500$                     2,503$                  151,700$            
Long, Billy R Y 697,846$      22,000$                -$                      354,400$            
Marchant, Kenny R Y 486,186$      -$                     -$                      342,504$            
McDermott, Jim D N 277,655$      500$                     1,500$                  167,700$            
McGovern, James P. D N 461,610$      4,350$                  250$                     232,841$            
Moore, Gwen D N 461,858$      500$                     -$                      353,325$            
Mulvaney, Mick R Y 345,433$      6,900$                  -$                      272,953$            
Olson, Pete R Y 740,663$      28,950$                -$                      445,040$            
Rangel, Charles B. D N 1,499,956$   2,750$                  -$                      467,200$            
Roe, David P. R N/A 522,428$      5,300$                  -$                      2,000$                
Rokita, Todd R Y 1,537,040$   35,750$                -$                      502,887$            
Schakowsky, Janice D. D N 767,083$      10,350$                -$                      179,650$            
Serrano, Jose E. D N 84,021$        -$                     -$                      70,750$              
Sessions, Pete R Y 1,270,202$   21,300$                -$                      552,281$            
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh D N 717,340$      6,500$                  250$                     383,150$            
Takano, Mark D N 471,536$      5,350$                  450$                     140,300$            
Walberg, Tim R Y 1,029,481$   41,280$                -$                      441,220$            
Westmoreland, Lynn A. R Y 446,172$      13,800$                -$                      274,130$            
Wilson, Frederica S. D N 257,092$      -$                     -$                      179,450$            
Wilson, Joe R Y 427,508$      23,508$                -$                      274,750$            
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Table 3 
Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Vote Choice on S. 1and Super 
PAC Funding 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Party Identification 
   Vote with PAC  Vote against PAC  Total 
Republican  17 (85%)   1 (7%)   18 
Democrat  3   (15%)   14 (93%)   17 
Total   20 (100%)  15 (100%)  35  
Note. x2=21.052, df=1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages. 
*p < .05  
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Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Representative D/R Vote Total Funds PAC Dollars (Y) PAC Dollars (N) PAC Total (%)
Blackburn, Marsha R Y 931,659$      6,300$                  -$                      584,914$            
Chu, Judy D N 541,893$      -$                     3,250$                  129,260$            
Clarke, Yvette D. D N 228,754$      -$                     5,110$                  166,008$            
Cohen, Steve D N 268,740$      -$                     5,200$                  192,002$            
Conyers, John, Jr. D N/A 282,049$      -$                     750$                     205,350$            
Duncan, Jeff R Y 280,525$      1,250$                  5,100$                  141,250$            
Edwards, Donna F. D N 2,166,226$   -$                     9,700$                  134,792$            
Ellison, Keith D N 1,028,207$   -$                     26,680$                153,500$            
Flores, Bill R Y 934,347$      6,500$                  1,891$                  546,770$            
Franks, Trent R Y 140,907$      6,750$                  -$                      90,250$              
Gohmert, Louie R Y 381,240$      15,850$                1,000$                  50,500$              
Gosar, Paul A. R Y 225,819$      -$                     -$                      106,500$            
Grijalva, Raul M. D N 280,119$      -$                     3,150$                  155,968$            
Hartzler, Vicky R Y 474,296$      -$                     -$                      176,900$            
Hastings, Alcee L. D N 218,841$      -$                     1,500$                  165,073$            
Honda, Michael M. D N 1,281,719$   -$                     79,651$                309,523$            
Huelskamp, Tim R Y 390,976$      11,550$                -$                      66,200$              
Jackson Lee, Sheila D N 171,171$      -$                     -$                      114,500$            
Lamborn, Doug R Y 286,818$      250$                     -$                      191,010$            
Latta, Robert E. R Y 435,620$      -$                     850$                     232,447$            
Lee, Barbara D N 583,870$      -$                     28,719$                151,700$            
Long, Billy R Y 697,846$      -$                     -$                      354,400$            
Marchant, Kenny R Y 486,186$      -$                     -$                      342,504$            
McDermott, Jim D N 277,655$      -$                     5,543$                  167,700$            
McGovern, James P. D N 461,610$      -$                     6,500$                  232,841$            
Moore, Gwen D N 461,858$      -$                     4,500$                  353,325$            
Mulvaney, Mick R Y 345,433$      5,650$                  -$                      272,953$            
Olson, Pete R Y 740,663$      -$                     -$                      445,040$            
Rangel, Charles B. D N 1,499,956$   -$                     19,525$                467,200$            
Roe, David P. R Y 522,428$      -$                     1,000$                  6,000$                
Rokita, Todd R Y 35,750$        3,850$                  -$                      502,887$            
Schakowsky, Janice D. D N 767,083$      -$                     17,110$                179,650$            
Serrano, Jose E. D N 84,021$        -$                     -$                      70,750$              
Sessions, Pete R Y 1,270,202$   -$                     9,050$                  552,281$            
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh D N 717,340$      -$                     5,254$                  383,150$            
Takano, Mark D N 471,536$      -$                     47,750$                140,300$            
Walberg, Tim R Y 1,029,481$   22,280$                6,400$                  441,220$            
Westmoreland, Lynn A. R Y 446,172$      -$                     500$                     274,130$            
Wilson, Frederica S. D N 257,092$      -$                     1,500$                  179,450$            
Wilson, Joe R Y 427,508$      2,835$                  -$                      274,750$            
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Table 5 
Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Vote Choice on H.R. 3009 and 
Super PAC Funding 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Party Identification 
   Vote with PAC  Vote against PAC  Total 
Republican  10 (37%)   5 (100%)  15 
Democrat  17   (63%)   0 (0%)   17  
Total   27 (100%)  5 (100%)  33  
Note. x2=6.721, df=1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages. 
*p < .05  
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Table 6 
 
 
 
 
Representative D/R Vote Total Funds PAC Dollars (Y) PAC Dollars (N) PAC Total (%)
Blackburn, Marsha R N 931,659$      -$                     -$                      584,914$            
Chu, Judy D Y 541,893$      -$                     1,000$                  129,260$            
Clarke, Yvette D. D Y 228,754$      -$                     -$                      166,008$            
Cohen, Steve D Y 268,740$      -$                     2,100$                  192,002$            
Conyers, John, Jr. D Y 282,049$      -$                     500$                     205,350$            
Duncan, Jeff R N 280,525$      -$                     -$                      141,250$            
Edwards, Donna F. D Y 2,166,226$   -$                     4,350$                  134,792$            
Ellison, Keith D Y 1,028,207$   -$                     4,100$                  153,500$            
Flores, Bill R N 934,347$      -$                     -$                      546,770$            
Franks, Trent R N 140,907$      -$                     11,500$                90,250$              
Gohmert, Louie R N 381,240$      -$                     6,100$                  50,500$              
Gosar, Paul A. R N 225,819$      -$                     3,750$                  106,500$            
Grijalva, Raul M. D Y 280,119$      -$                     4,600$                  155,968$            
Hartzler, Vicky R N 474,296$      -$                     -$                      176,900$            
Hastings, Alcee L. D N 218,841$      -$                     -$                      165,073$            
Honda, Michael M. D Y 1,281,719$   -$                     17,200$                309,523$            
Huelskamp, Tim R N 390,976$      -$                     -$                      66,200$              
Jackson Lee, Sheila D Y 171,171$      -$                     -$                      114,500$            
Lamborn, Doug R N 286,818$      -$                     30,853$                191,010$            
Latta, Robert E. R N 435,620$      -$                     -$                      232,447$            
Lee, Barbara D Y 583,870$      -$                     1,750$                  151,700$            
Long, Billy R N 697,846$      -$                     8,000$                  354,400$            
Marchant, Kenny R N 486,186$      -$                     -$                      342,504$            
McDermott, Jim D Y 277,655$      -$                     1,000$                  167,700$            
McGovern, James P. D Y 461,610$      -$                     2,250$                  232,841$            
Moore, Gwen D Y 461,858$      -$                     10,450$                353,325$            
Mulvaney, Mick R N 345,433$      -$                     -$                      272,953$            
Olson, Pete R N 740,663$      -$                     -$                      445,040$            
Rangel, Charles B. D Y 1,499,956$   -$                     12,700$                467,200$            
Roe, David P. R N 522,428$      -$                     -$                      6,000$                
Rokita, Todd R N 35,750$        -$                     13,800$                502,887$            
Schakowsky, Janice D. D Y 767,083$      -$                     60,400$                179,650$            
Serrano, Jose E. D Y 84,021$        -$                     -$                      70,750$              
Sessions, Pete R N 1,270,202$   -$                     5,600$                  552,281$            
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh D Y 717,340$      -$                     -$                      383,150$            
Takano, Mark D Y 471,536$      -$                     19,525$                140,300$            
Walberg, Tim R N 1,029,481$   -$                     -$                      441,220$            
Westmoreland, Lynn A. R N 446,172$      -$                     -$                      274,130$            
Wilson, Frederica S. D Y 257,092$      -$                     1,000$                  179,450$            
Wilson, Joe R N 427,508$      -$                     1,000$                  274,750$            
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Table 7 
Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Vote Choice on H.R. 3461 and 
Super PAC Funding 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Party Identification 
   Vote with PAC  Vote against PAC  Total 
Republican  8 (100%)  0 (0%)   8 
Democrat  0   (0%)   15 (100%)  15   
Total   8 (100%)  15 (100%)  23 
Note. x2=22.996, df=1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages. 
*p < .05  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
